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According to Claire Finkelstein,' criminal liability should not be imposed for
negligence because people are not responsible for unforeseen acts. What is it to be
morally responsible for an event? It is, I take it, to be exposed (or, if you will,
answerable) to moral assessment in respect of the occurrence of that event. This is
not the same thing as being culpable or praiseworthy for the event-rather, moral
responsibility is a precondition, one that must be satisfied before we can proceed to
those moral judgments. Moral responsibility requires that the event at issue be
attributable in some way to the actor's voluntary conduct, 2 and also that the actor
be a morally responsible agent. 3 In turn, the governing principles of (moral)
attribution include, for example, principles of causation and complicity, but not
principles of vicarious liability. I am morally responsible for breaking the window
when I kick a football through it while playing with my son in the back garden. I
am not morally, though I may be legally, responsible for breaking the neighbor's
window if it is my son who kicks the ball. Neither am I morally responsible for
the murder of the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh. Her death was not the
consequence of, or otherwise attributable to, any conduct of mine. Mijailo
Mijailovic did it.
On this account, the role of moral responsibility is both positive and negative.
It marks out those to whom we can look for an explanation when something goes
wrong and, in so doing, operates to exclude other actors from moral judgment with
respect to that event. In its positive guise, moral responsibility is a necessary, but
not a sufficient, condition of praise or blame. Thus responsibility and culpability
are not the same thing. One is a condition of the other. I may be morally
responsible for wounding James and, at the same time, not culpable for doing so
because I was acting in justified self-defense. In her paper, Finkelstein notes that
this is sometimes characterized as a distinction between descriptive and normative
conceptions of responsibility, where the former is concerned with "prima facie
responsibility" and the latter with "ultimate blameworthiness. 4 There is no harm
in this, provided the distinction is maintained without confusion. What counts is
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when, and why, we should conclude that an actor is (or is not) culpable or
praiseworthy for an event.5 I am not culpable for Anna Lindh's killing because I
was not responsible for it: I am not culpable for James's killing because my killing
him was justified.
In Finkelstein's account, advertence to-foresight of-an event is a condition
of responsibility. Without it, further questions of justification, excuse, and indeed
of culpability generally, simply do not arise. The demesne of responsibility
embraces only those things that one does intentionally; those things for which we
can ask the actor, "why did you do that?", and expect by way of response an
account of the actor's motivating reasons that explains why he did it.6 Consider
the following example:7
A seller of goods is about to ship some heavily insured cargo aboard a
passenger plane, when the buyer cancels his order for the goods. Faced
with the prospect of imminent financial ruin, the seller formulates a plan
to destroy the plane: plant a bomb to explode mid-flight and collect the
insurance on the goods. He regrets that the passengers will almost
certainly die in the process, but he is not dissuaded. He executes his
plan, and as expected the cargo is destroyed, and no one survives. Call
this case "Insurance Bomber." 8
Finkelstein contrasts the killing of the passengers with unforeseen effects of
Insurance Bomber's conduct:
Suppose we were to ask the Insurance Bomber why he killed the
passengers. Although he cannot answer with "in order to get the
insurance money," he might respond by saying "Well, I wanted the
insurance money, and to get it I had to blow up the plane and kill the
passengers." Compare this Why? question with a question about
5 In the rest of this paper, I will focus on culpability rather than praiseworthiness for an event.
While each requires that the actor be morally responsible for the event, their further criteria are
asymmetric. See, e.g., ERIC D'ARCY, HUMAN ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THEIR MORAL EVALUATION 126,
161-62, 166 (1963).
6 Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 594.
7 Id. at 585. Glanville Williams was the first to introduce examples of this type. See
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 34-35 (1965); Oblique Intention, 46
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 417, 423 (1987).
8 This is, it must be said, an odd example with which to debate the outer limits of
responsibility-it is certainly an inappropriate example with which to defend Finkelstein's Thesis (1),
supra note 1 at 585, that "someone does something intentionally if and only if he does it for a
reason," since it is arguable that the deaths of the passengers are not merely foreseen (or, in her
usage, "intentional") but intended. Either way, the deaths are much nearer the core of morally
responsible acts than even Finkelstein would require. For discussion of the problem of inseparable
effects, see A.P. Simester, Moral Certainty and the Boundaries of Intention, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 445 (1996).
602 [Vol 2:601
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INADVERTENTACTS
something else the Insurance Bomber might have done, namely run the
insurance company out of business by creating such a large claim....
Unlike his answer to the question why he killed the passengers, the
insurance bomber might answer this question with an expression of
surprise-"Did I do that?" This gives us a basis for thinking that "the
Why? question test differentiates foreseen from unforeseen effects of an
agent's action. 9
We do not need the "Why?" question to differentiate foreseen from
unforeseen effects. They are already differentiated by the test of foresight.
Moreover, as Finkelstein implicitly admits in the first two sentences of the passage
quoted, the "Why?" question generates many more distinctions than the one she
highlights. Besides separating the foreseen from the unforeseen, it also
differentiates between directly intended effects-those done as a means or end-
and merely foreseen effects. Indeed, it distinguishes even amongst means and
ends. When I wound James, it matters crucially whether I did so in order to protect
myself or whether I did so because I like hurting people.'0 If asked why I hurt
James, in the former case my answer would take the form, "in order to . " In
the latter case, it would be, "for the sake of it."
The "Why?" question suggests that, when we consider the culpability of an
actor who does something advertently, it may very well matter whether the thing
done was intended for its own sake, was intended as a means to something further,
or was done merely intentionally as a side-effect of what was intended." But it
does not suggest that things done inadvertently are outside the realm of our
responsibility. When Insurance Bomber is asked why he ran the insurance
company out of business, and responds "Did I do that?," the answer is: "Yes, you
did!" "Did I kick the football through the window?" "Yes, you did!" And then the
discussion retums, properly, to the explanation of why.
Finkelstein argues, at length, that we are responsible for the things that we do
advertently. This seems right. As she says, we are responsible because we
knowingly choose them. When we choose to do the wrong thing, we align
ourselves with that wrong; we do it for inadequate reasons and, in the absence of a
suitable excuse, we are culpable with respect to that wrong. But the proposition
(i), culpable if chosen, does not imply the proposition (ii), not culpable if not
chosen. This is a simple point of logic. We may all agree, and most of us do
agree, that wrongdoing is ceteris paribus blameworthy if, when, and because
chosen. But that agreement tells us nothing whatsoever about whether inadvertent
9 Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 591.
10 This is so even if, in indulging my passion for hurting people, I happen to save myself from
James's attack. See A.P. Simester, Why Distinguish Intention From Foresight?, in HARM AND
CULPABILITY 71 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); see also John Gardner, Justifications
and Reasons, at 103, and the contrasting view of Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of
Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, at 45, in the same volume.
" Or so I have argued elsewhere. See Simester, supra note 10.
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wrongdoing can ever be blameworthy. Proposition (ii) may or may not be true.
But proposition (i) cannot help us decide.
The flaw is methodological. Finkelstein explicitly analyzes inadvertence "by
the back door."' 12 She extrapolates a conception of responsibility from the central
case of advertent wrongdoing, proposing to "see what it in turn implies for cases of
negligence." But the answer is, as a matter of analytical necessity, nothing.
Extrapolation is not like interpolation: one simply cannot transfer implications, by
extrapolation, from one range of cases to cases that lie outside that range.' 3 And
the whole point with inadvertent acts is that they lie outside the realm of advertent
acts. They possess crucially different features, about which Finkelstein's analysis
is silent. Analytically, there is no way of concluding that her approach will yield
the whole of the responsibility story.
For all that, her analysis of intentional acts highlights two important features
whose absence, she suggests, militates against responsibility for inadvertence.
First, there is said to be a "felt connection" between responsibility and what is
done intentionally:
Imagine how outrageous it would be for the bomber to say, "Yes, I admit
I killed the passengers intentionally, since I knew that they would die.
But I am not responsible for killing them, since I didn't intend to do so."
Rather, the fact that he killed them intentionally seems to carry with it
the idea that he is responsible for killing them. And conversely, it would
be only a little less odd for someone to deny that he did something
intentionally, but not regard that as mitigating his responsibility. The
person who says, "I didn't do it intentionally" seems to be making a plea
for exoneration. He seems to be offering his hearers a reason why they
should not blame him for something he did.
14
There are six sentences here, which between them sketch an argument from
commonly-held moral intuition. The first four are largely unproblematic.
Finkelstein is right insofar as she asserts that, intuitively, most of us hold people
responsible for what they do advertently. And she is still on fairly solid ground
when she suggests that we tend to accept inadvertence as a ground of mitigation.
Conceivably, there might be persons who are a kind of moral monster, to whom
the interests of others are so worthless that they systematically overlook the
12 Finkelstein, supra note, 1, at 581.
13 It may help to illustrate this point with a statistical analogy. When the New Zealand
government was considering whether to ban tobacco advertising in the early 1990s, the Department
of Health investigated the relationship between historical levels of tobacco advertising and tobacco
consumption. It then attempted to predict what would happen to tobacco consumption if advertising
were banned. The problem with this analysis was that advertising levels had never been zero in the
past. As a result, there were no data to support a prediction of likely consumption levels given zero
advertising. The existing data were in a different range.
14 Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 587.
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implications of their conduct for the lives of anyone else. We might well be
horrified by that type of thoughtlessness, and believe it profoundly evil. More
often, however, we think of negligence as less culpable than advertent wrongdoing.
When, without thinking of the risk, I kick the football through a neighbor's
window, "I didn't mean to" has moral significance. I did not deliberately
subordinate my neighbor's interests to my preferences. And we cannot say that I
would have done the same had I foreseen the risk. My culpability is, we think,
mitigated.
But it is a stride upon thin air to describe this as a plea for exoneration.
Mitigation and exoneration are different things. If our culpability is mitigated, we
are still at fault-just less so. Despite the fact that we did the wrong thing, we
deserve less blame in virtue of the mitigating factors in play. By contrast, when a
person is exonerated, he is not culpable at all. One may be exonerated for various
sorts of reasons. Perhaps, on closer investigation, it turns out that I have an alibi
and was not responsible for killing the Swedish Foreign Minister. Or it turns out
that James was attacking me, and that I was responsible but justified in killing him.
In any decent criminal legal system, if I am morally exonerated I should not be
convicted. But when I make a plea in mitigation, I offer only a partial defense
(such as provocation), or a claim to have my sentence reduced. I do not ask to be
acquitted altogether. To argue that my culpability is mitigated is to assert that I am
both responsible and culpable; it is to argue about the degree of culpability on
show.
It is not only a false step from mitigation to exoneration, but is also a step
unsupported by ordinary moral intuitions. Contrary to Finkelstein's report,15 it
seems to me that in practice we do not accept "I simply forgot" as an exonerating
defense. Such a plea may be part of a claim to exoneration, but only if, further, it
was reasonable for the actor to have forgotten. I may be excused from blame after
forgetting a haircut appointment when distracted by an emergency. But it is not
reasonable to forget to appear at my wedding because I am distracted by the
football game on television. The former is exonerated: the latter is culpable. 16 Our
moral assessment of such cases depends, of course, on the particular scenario. But
that is the point. We are not tout court absolved from responsibility for our
inadvertent acts.
The second consideration to which Finkelstein points is the need to connect
responsibility ascriptions with our nature as rational beings who act for reasons.
Assessments of culpability and praiseworthiness tie events distinctively to
human agents. They do so in virtue of qualities that mark us out from other agents:
the rational capacity to act for reasons, to act for them qua reasons, and to
" Id. at 581.
16 To test this claim about ordinary moral judgments, while writing this reply in Boston, I
informally surveyed about twenty academics (none lawyers or philosophers!) at the Business School
of M.I.T., presenting them with the two scenarios in the text. The intuitive response of every single
respondent was that, while the failure in the first scenario was excusable, that in the second was
culpable.
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deliberate about those reasons. This is why it is a condition of moral
responsibility, as I said at the beginning, that the actor be a morally responsible
agent. She must be the kind of agent who is capable of recognizing and acting
upon reasons, who has at least a general capacity to distinguish *good reasons from
bad, and who can adjudicate between conflicting reasons, by weighing and
contrasting them, when deciding what to do.
Finkelstein demands rather more. For her, responsibility is about "capturing
an agent's relation to things he does qua rational agent, since these are things for
which it makes sense to raise questions of praise or blame."17 To perform an act
qua rational agent is, she says, deliberately to choose to do that act for reasons that
the agent herself endorses.' 8 On this view, we are morally responsible only when
we exercise our capacity to act for reasons-it is only then that we are truly
human. In turn, we are at fault only when we deliberately act for bad reasons.
That claim is too strong. We are human beings not in virtue of exercising our
rational capacities, but in virtue of our having them. The perfectly virtuous person
exercises them perfectly. The culpable person fails to exercise them adequately.
This does not imply that he exercises them badly. Perhaps he fails to exercise
them, or some of them, at all. That, too, can be a fault. Or he might indeed
exercise his rational capacities badly, but without deliberately choosing to act for
bad reasons. The capacity for rational deliberation is not just about the
adjudication between conflicting reasons; it is also about their recognition. Thus,
fault can also lie in a person's failure to recognize the reasons why he should not
act as he does. There is more than one way to go wrong.
When a person is reckless, he elects to act for the wrong reasons. When he is
negligent, he fails to act for the right reasons. But either way, when he is at fault it
is because the deficiency reflects upon him qua human being. In the exercise of
his rational capacities he has unreasonably, inexcusably, fallen short. It is a further
challenge, of course, to give an account of when he is at fault: of which failures to
act for good reasons are culpable. That challenge cannot be taken up here.'
9
Certainly, not all inadvertent acts are culpable-we acknowledge this, in legal
usage, with the familiar distinction between negligence and accident. One does not
have to think of everything. But on Finkelstein's account, we need think of
nothing.
17 Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 583.
'8 Thus, Finkelstein concludes that "an agent must have actually deliberated upon a
consequence of an action in order for us to explain what he did as a product of his reason. ...
Deliberation puts the stamp of rational agency on what an agent does." Id. at 593.
19 1 have sought to provide such an account in A.P. Simester, Can Negligence be Culpable?,
in OXFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 85 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th Series 2000).
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